Sunday June 1, 2025
By Abdirashid Elmi & Mohamed Musa
It has been three years since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected through Somalia's indirect electoral model, wherein parliamentarians appointed by clan delegates select the president. With only one year remaining in his mandate, debates have intensified regarding the nature of the power transfer upon its conclusion. President Mohamud has consistently asserted that a one-person, one-vote (1P1V) election is the sole legitimate mechanism for transferring power. To this end, the federal government has unilaterally established an electoral committee that has initiated a hasty voter registration drive in parts of Mogadishu.
While a shift toward direct elections marks an important democratic aspiration, significant skepticism surrounds the feasibility of this process, given the prevailing security challenges in many regions and opposition from certain federal member states. Critics argue that the president's push for 1P1V may be a strategic move to extend his tenure under the guise of democratic reform. The unilateral nature of the voter registration efforts, without broad consensus from all federal member states and other stakeholders, further exacerbates tensions and raises concerns about the legitimacy of the proposed electoral process.
This brief assesses the political and logistical feasibility of various electoral scenarios. It evaluates the risks and prospects associated with each, with the goal of informing realistic, inclusive, and practical policy decisions for Somalia's democratic transition.
Background
Somalia's political landscape has long been characterized by indirect electoral processes rooted in clan-based power-sharing arrangements. These systems, while initially intended as temporary measures to stabilize governance post-civil war, have persisted and now face significant criticism for fostering corruption and marginalizing minority groups. Despite gradual progress toward building governance structures aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability, the current administration's actions risk undermining these gains and potentially destabilizing the state.
Electoral Scenarios for 2026
- The proposed shift to a 1P1V electoral system marks a significant democratic milestone. However, substantial obstacles hinder its feasibility:
- Security Challenges: Persistent insecurity, particularly in regions surrounding the capital, poses significant risks to nationwide electoral processes.
- Institutional Capacity: Decades of conflict have severely weakened Somalia's institutional capacity, with key institutions needed to administer credible elections remaining underdeveloped or non-functional.
- Infrastructure Deficits: The absence of foundational judicial and electoral infrastructure—such as comprehensive voter registration systems and robust logistical frameworks—significantly hampers the feasibility of implementing direct elections in Somalia. These critical deficits not only impede the operational capacity to conduct nationwide voting but also undermine the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process itself. Without substantial investment in institutional capacity-building and infrastructure development, the transition to a one-person, one-vote system remains a formidable challenge.
Given these challenges, the 1P1V model appears impractical under the currently prevailing conditions.
Constrained Voter Model
This intermediate approach involves conducting parliamentary elections in select representative cities within each member state. It aims to enhance public participation and accountability while mitigating the risks associated with broader electoral processes. However, the model faces significant hurdles:
- Federal-State Relations: The strained relationship between the federal government and specific member states undermines the collaborative framework necessary for the success of this model.
- Infrastructure and Logistics: Establishing the requisite infrastructure and logistical support in selected cities remains a formidable challenge.
While the constrained voter model offers a more feasible alternative to universal suffrage, its implementation is contingent upon improved federal-state cooperation and infrastructural development.
Traditional Clan-Based Model
Under this model, parliamentary members are selected by clan electors chosen by traditional clan leaders. Despite its shortcomings, including susceptibility to corruption and limited inclusivity, this model remains the most practical option given the current political climate.
Presidential Term Extension
In the context of Somalia's ongoing electoral challenges, there is a growing concern that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may seek to extend his term through parliamentary approval. Given the current dysfunctionality of Parliament, such an extension could be granted, potentially exacerbating state fragility and leading to further fragmentation.
This scenario, by far, is the most perilous. The President faces significant unpopularity both domestically and internationally. Recently, over 100 members of Parliament have publicly called for his resignation, citing failures in national security, foreign policy, and governance. Additionally, opposition leaders have condemned any attempts at term extension, viewing them as unconstitutional and a threat to Somalia's fragile democratic processes.
In this climate of political tension and public dissatisfaction, any move by the President to overstay his mandated term could further destabilize the nation and undermine efforts toward democratic governance.
The way forward
Among the electoral models under consideration, two appear to be readily feasible: the traditional clan-based model and the constrained voter (CV) model. The CV model offers clear advantages, notably by expanding representation beyond the limited circle of clan elders, thereby enhancing inclusivity and accountability.
However, the implementation of the CV model faces its challenges. The deteriorating relationship between the federal government and some of the federal member states, such as Puntland and Jubbaland, has led to a breakdown in cooperation. For instance, neither Puntland nor Jubbaland has attended the National Consultative meeting recently held in Mogadishu. The lack of participation by some federal states diminishes the likelihood of collaborative efforts necessary for establishing the infrastructure required for the CV model.
Moreover, some regional leaders may prefer to pursue their re-election independently, as in the case of Jubbaland, reducing their incentive to engage in a federal electoral process. Given these dynamics, the CV model may not yield the desired outcomes for the President and could necessitate a strategic reassessment.
Conclusions
All of the scenarios described remain largely theoretical, yet some clearly offer a more credible path forward. Despite the president's insistence, a nationwide one-person-one-vote election is, under current security and institutional limitations, practically unattainable. Consequently, the constrained-voter (CV) model emerges as the most feasible compromise, broadening participation beyond traditional clan-based systems, albeit with significant challenges. Should elections proceed as scheduled, candidates with early access to critical information and superior organizational capabilities will hold a competitive advantage. Empirical evidence also suggests that larger, more inclusive electorates yield more legitimate and broadly accepted outcomes, as voters tend to support leaders they trust to serve the national interest. Given the incumbent's sharply eroded public credibility—damaged by persistent corruption allegations—it is highly likely that Somalia will install a new president in 2026.
Abdirashid Elmi, PhD, Professor at Kuwait University, Kuwait E-mail: ainanh63@yahoo.com
Mohamed Musa, PhD, Professor at Gulf University of Science and Technology, Kuwait
E-mail: beddel06@gmail.com