Thursday September 25, 2025
By Abdirashid Fidow
More than a decade after Somalia adopted federalism as a post-conflict solution, the system remains at odds with the realities on the ground. Unless urgently reformed or replaced, Somalia’s federal experiment may deepen the very fragmentation it sought to prevent, writes Abdirachid Fidow.
When Somalia’s leaders adopted federalism in 2012, it was more a political compromise than an ideological consensus. The previous centralised model had collapsed with the fall of former president Siad Barre in 1991. The subsequent vacuum was filled by clan militias and later, Islamist insurgents. Years of conflict, mistrust and international pressure gave rise to a new compromise: federalism, designed to distribute power and reduce clan rivalry by avoiding a winner takes all mentality.
The goal was to give local regions more autonomy while simultaneously building a cohesive national state. The hope was that this would reconcile Somalia’s complex social fabric with the need for national governance. But in 2025, this vision is under severe strain and lacks political coherence.
The federal reality
Somalia’s current federal arrangement consists of six recognised Federal Member States: Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Southwest, and the newly recognised SSC-Khaatumo. In parallel, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland continues to function as a de facto independent entity. Each federal state maintains its own president, parliament, and security apparatus. While this system was intended to promote local governance and reduce conflict, it has instead institutionalised fragmentation and created fertile ground for regional warlordism. Somalia’s federalism has become a precarious balancing act between empowerment and disintegration.
Unlike classic territorial federations, Somalia’s federalism is largely clan-based. States like Hirshabelle and Southwest were drawn from political compromises rather than organic identities.
Unlike territorial federations, where units grow from geography, history or shared language, Somalia’s map largely reflects elite bargains. Districts were merged or split to balance dominant clans rather than to reflect regional identities. In practice, budgets, appointments, and policing lineage hierarchies. This leaves marginalised communities, agricultural labourers, coastal minorities, and occupational castes, under-represented across legislatures, cabinets, and the security sector at both federal and state levels.
This structure has reinforced exclusionary politics, leaving minority groups without a stake in governance. Boundary disputes and clan competition over resources regularly disrupt governance.
The Federal Government in Mogadishu remains chronically under-resourced and heavily reliant on foreign aid and African Union peacekeepers for its finance and security and struggles to project authority beyond the capital.
Competing narratives of authority
One of the core challenges of Somalia’s federal model lies in the contested legitimacy of its constituent states. Puntland declared itself an autonomous state in 1998, long before the 2012 provisional constitution. As a result, it sees itself as a founding entity, unbound by the federal order. It frequently challenges federal authority, suspends cooperation with Mogadishu, and maintains its own political and administrative systems. Jubaland has similarly asserted independence, backed by its own security forces and strategic alliances with neighbouring states.
Somalia still operates under a provisional constitution from 2012. Without a finalised federal constitution with clearly defined roles, powers, and responsibilities, Somalia’s federalism remains based on conflicting interpretations. States behave how they see fit, and the federal government lacks the legitimacy or capacity to enforce cohesion. Until there is consensus on the structure and purpose of federalism, Somalia will remain caught in a tug-of-war between centre and periphery.
The terrorist group Al-Shabaab has stepped into the cracks of fragmented authority. Each Federal Member State maintains its own armed forces or militias, often loyal to regional elites rather than the central government. This patchwork of uncoordinated actors has made joint operations against Al-Shabaab inconsistent and at times counterproductive. In South-West State, the group has exploited local grievances, especially among clans excluded from local power-sharing. For some marginalised groups, Al-Shabaab is not a threat, but a vehicle for asserting local agency in the absence of inclusive governance.
Without a unified counterterrorism strategy and a political settlement based on inclusion, federalism risks enabling insecurity rather than containing it.
Federalism as a proxy battleground
Somalia’s federalism has become a stage for foreign ambitions, each seeking to assert influence in the absence of a strong central authority. Ethiopia eyes buffer zones, Kenya eyes the border, Turkey builds military bases and infrastructure in the name of brotherhood, Qatar moves through shadowed corridors of influence, and Saudi Arabia preaches through pulpits.
The Somali federal government cannot convene its own member states or set foot in certain regions, but foreign ambassadors move freely across them. The UAE has managed what no Somali leader has: simultaneous relationships with Mogadishu, Puntland, Jubaland, and even Somaliland. In the absence of Somali unity, it is Abu Dhabi, a foreign land, that has become the thread connecting Somalia’s broken politics.
Despite its theoretical promise, the idea of federalism in Somalia is increasingly misaligned with political realities. Instead of promoting cooperation or good governance, it has entrenched local elite power struggles, enabled foreign interference, and stalled security reform. If it is to endure, federalism must be radically reimagined. Not as symbolic decentralisation, but as functional governance rooted in a shared national vision.
Somalia’s history of premature state-building offers cautionary lessons. The First Republic of the 1960s adopted parliamentary democracy without building durable institutions. Likewise, the Third Republic’s federalism in 2012 was driven by donor timelines and elite bargains, not grassroots consensus. A longer, internationally supported transitional phase may have helped build unity and legitimacy. Instead, embassies opened, foreign deals were signed, and bilateral ties were pursued often without national alignment.
This has led to where we are now. Federal Member States assert growing autonomy while the federal government struggles to remain relevant. Even the president has at times been unable to visit Puntland or Jubaland because federal presidents have denied them entry. What was meant to foster unity has instead become a platform for fragmentation, with no clear path toward reconciliation.
Despite this, federalism in Somalia is limping forward in the absence of a viable alternative. The crisis is not merely institutional; it is deeply political. The dysfunction stems less from the structure of federalism itself and more from a political elite that lacks vision, leadership, and any shared sense of national purpose. Too many actors remain beholden to clan interests and short-term gain, often propped up by foreign patrons whose priorities are anything but Somali unity.
Mogadishu has instigated a constitutional review process to replace the provisional document, and with national elections looming, the country is hurtling toward a decisive juncture. This is about whether Somalia can survive as a state. Unless federalism is reimagined through a Somali-led, inclusive, and sovereign framework, the very idea of a unified Somalia risks fading into history.
Fragmentation is deepening. Foreign interference is intensifying. And international goodwill is running out. The clock is ticking, and Somalia’s future hangs in the balance.
Abdirashid Fidow is the Deputy Chief Executive of the Anti-Tribalism Movement, a political analyst, and social justice campaigner based in London and Nairobi. He frequently writes on topics such as foreign policy, Somali politics, Africa, Islam, and counterterrorism. He can be reached on X at @iamfidow or by email at abdirachid.fidow@gmail.com