Monday August 4, 2025
Somalia has been in political turmoil for years. Yet Somalis are not having the national conversation about the constitutional and civic foundations needed to address it. Instead, public debate remains fixated on the turbulence itself—tracking rivalries, disputes, and shifting alliances—without confronting the institutional voids that allow the turmoil to persist. Somali opinion writing mirrors this fixation—fragmented, reactive, and more attuned to political drama than to structural diagnosis. On platforms like Hiiraan Online and other Somali media, essays catalogue familiar divisions: chronic regional rivalries, political feuds, and clan mistrust. Some rally behind factions in the name of federalism or reform; others conclude with broad appeals for unity. Rarely do they probe the institutional roots of these disputes or outline practical steps toward resolution.
Scholars and political analysts have long pointed to deeper structural causes behind Somalia’s political crisis. The visible rifts—leadership rivalries, disputes between the federal and state levels, tensions among regions, and persistent clan mistrust—are real, but their endurance reflects something more fundamental: a fragile national identity [2] and weak governance structures. The public’s limited grasp of how government should function only magnifies the instability. [3] Disputes over who controls elections, the scope of federal and state laws, authority over resources and security, and the legitimacy of political mandates all arise from an unsettled constitutional order [4] that, in turn, keeps these disputes alive. Yet much commentary still treats them mainly as matters of disunity, poor leadership, or entrenched clan loyalties, offering blame or broad appeals for unity instead of tracing events to the unfinished governance framework that could turn persistent conflict into manageable disagreement. Leadership failures and clan mistrust do matter, but they operate within a deeper vacuum that only constitutional clarity and strong institutions can fill.
This pattern points to a broader failure of the media to place such disputes within their proper constitutional context. Reporting and commentary often treat intergovernmental disputes, challenges to political mandates, and other political confrontations as isolated incidents, with little explanation of the underlying structural causes or guidance to help readers understand how governance is meant to function. [5] The result is a feedback loop in which fragmented narration normalizes fragmentation, leading the public to view each dispute as an isolated crisis or a product of social division, rather than a symptom of an incomplete political order. That is a missed opportunity to explain, teach, and help the public engage in nation‑building rather than remain bystanders.
Somalia’s chronic disunity is not only the result of opportunism or mistrust; it is the predictable outcome of a state that has failed to ground political life in constitutional norms. The Provisional Constitution leaves key elements of Somalia’s governance unfinished in different ways. Some powers — including those over natural resources, security, and revenue sharing — are explicitly deferred under Article 54 for future negotiations between the federal and state governments, which have yet to take place. Other matters, such as the creation of constitutional commissions and the establishment of the federal court system, are assigned to the federal political branches but remain unimplemented. Still others are left ambiguous, with no agreed process for determining which level of government should exercise them. Yet, political negotiations have so far been ad hoc, crisis‑driven, and narrowly focused on short‑term settlements rather than completing the constitutional framework. Perhaps the most important unresolved matter is the set of powers deferred under Article 54, which have yet to be conclusively addressed through broad-based negotiation. Without that foundation, parliament’s other mandated actions, such as legislating on required institutions and commissions, have stalled, and ambiguities over other powers remain unresolved. In this vacuum, political actors rely on improvisation and selective readings of the law to justify short‑term aims. Commentators, from opinion writers to public thinkers and civic educators, should lead in naming this pattern and in interpreting events through the constitutional lens the country lacks.
Improvisational governance is not unique to Somalia. What sets Somalia apart is that political actors, in both action and rhetoric, often bypass constitutional constraints by exploiting limited societal cohesion [2] and the public’s weak understanding of how government should function [3]. In particular, the lack of civic grasp leaves citizens ill‑equipped to judge competing claims of power, allowing clan loyalty to become the default frame for political alignment rather than adherence to lawful process. In such an environment, improvisation becomes a tool for political actors to exploit public confusion and sidestep institutional limits. In a world of unclear rules, political actors tap into clan loyalties while speaking the language of federalism, exploiting its centrifugal pull to shape alliances and disputes. The result is politics driven by group advantage, eroding any sense of shared belonging and weakening the foundations of a national project. Responsible commentary should confront this head‑on, shifting the frame from raw power and clan advantage to collective interests, strong institutions, and sound constitutional design. This is not theory—it is a step toward national unity. Around the world, opinion writers, educators, and political commentators shape governance by explaining how systems should work and holding leaders to those standards. It is time for Somali voices to embrace that role.
Much of Somali political commentary sidesteps its responsibility. Federalism is often portrayed either as a barrier to unity or as a ready‑made system needing only goodwill. In reality, it is neither; it is an ongoing experiment stalled by missing guardrails because of unresolved basics—power‑sharing, resource allocation, and dispute resolution. Without these safeguards, federalism has drifted into clan federalism, merging with clan loyalty to perpetuate fragmentation. Political commentary should connect this breakdown to unresolved powers and weak institutions, showing that it is not inevitable but the result of the absence of clear constitutional roles and rules. Framing debate in these terms can move it beyond blame toward the steps needed to make federalism a functioning system. Political commentators should be driving home the point that without constitutional guardrails, federalism will remain a source of conflict rather than a path to stability.
The vertical dimension of federalism—the allocation of authority between federal and state governments—remains undefined in crucial areas. Beyond a few enumerated powers, the constitution tasks parliament with creating institutions that serve as constitutional guardrails, and tasks political actors with defining each institution’s responsibilities through negotiation. Yet Somalia still lacks a negotiation framework accepted by all actors. As a result, Federal Member States and the political opposition often accuse the federal government of overreach, while federal authorities justify unilateral action in the name of cohesion and security. Without a constitutional process to resolve such disputes—such as independent, competent federal courts—all sides rely on assertions rather than constitutional commitments, fueling mistrust and turning politics into a contest of tactics rather than responsibility. Commentators that describe these conflicts without pointing to the missing framework risks reinforcing the very problem they should help address.
The horizontal dimension—the separation of powers within each level of government—is equally neglected. Parliament has not only been weak but has also failed to establish the constitutional institutions it is mandated to create, such as the federal courts and independent commissions. With these institutions absent or vulnerable, the executive inevitably dominates, turning federalism into a contest between leaders rather than a balance of institutions. In this environment, Somali political discourse fixates on which leader is opposing which: member state leaders against the federal president, the federal president against state leaders, and opposition figures against the sitting administration. This focus on personalities and shifting alliances masks the deeper problem: the absence of a completed governance framework that federalism relies upon.
Federalism assumes that conflict is inevitable—and the strength of a system lies in how it manages that conflict through agreed rules and institutions. In Somalia’s case, these institutions include federal courts at two federal levels (High Court and Constitutional Court), a Judicial Service Commission to protect and oversee the judiciary, and a range of independent bodies designed to regulate elections, resolve administrative and intergovernmental disputes, uphold human rights, and guide cooperative governance. When functional, these institutions would anchor federalism in constitutional accountability, preventing it from drifting into crisis and becoming a tool for rent‑seeking. Somalia’s federalism framework remains in its embryonic stage at best, leaving conflicts open‑ended, personalized, and prone to destabilization. Political commentary should make clear to the public that without the guardrails needed to guide federalism, Somalia will keep drifting into chaos, where unresolved constitutional questions and entrenched clan loyalties drive recurring crises and risk eventual disintegration.
The country’s divisions are well known, but knowing them is not enough. What is missing is a shared understanding of the legal and institutional steps required to turn federalism from a political aspiration into a functioning system — steps that would also help weaken the country’s divisions. Without rules, boundaries, and institutions to contain conflict, disputes remain personal, unrestrained, and destabilizing. Too often, media and commentary dwell on political rifts without confronting the institutional failures that cause them, reinforcing the very fragmentation they lament. The shift Somalia needs is from sentiment to explanation, from blame to governance context, from personality‑driven narratives to institutional roadmaps. Opinion writers, educators, and other commentators should make clear that state‑building means creating institutions one defined responsibility at a time—and that in Somalia, that process has yet to begin in a sustained and credible way.
It is worth repeating: federalism is not a finished system waiting to be implemented. It is an ongoing political experiment that must be built step by step, completed through negotiation, and continuously maintained. Even once a workable framework is in place, it requires constant attention—refining rules, strengthening institutional capacity, and adapting to new realities—to keep it functioning as intended. Left unattended, institutions inevitably drift; keeping them on course requires constant attention from both political actors and the public. In Somalia, many of federalism’s key features still need to be defined so that they serve the needs of the governed. This begins with specifying the division of powers, clarifying boundaries, agreeing on revenue‑sharing, and establishing neutral mechanisms for resolving disputes. Federalism, as an experiment, requires identifying the constitutional gaps that invite unilateralism and conflict—and closing them, one gap at a time. These are not technical details; they are the foundations of state‑building under federalism. Commentators who fail to explain them leave their audience with grievances but no roadmap.
Somalia’s crisis is as much constitutional and civic as it is political. Yet too often, commentary focuses on visible disputes while overlooking the institutional voids that sustain them and the civic foundations that must be strengthened. Closing this gap requires shifting the national conversation from sentiment to explanation, and from personality‑driven narratives to a governance‑based dialogue focused on building the framework for stability. Educators, civil society, community leaders, and others who shape public understanding must take the lead in steering this conversation toward the crisis’s underlying causes, the absent rules and institutions, and the shared responsibilities without which a state cannot function. Until that happens, the national discourse will continue to lament fragmentation while deepening the very misunderstandings that perpetuate it. The task is not more words but better ones—anchored in governance, translating events into the rules and processes that should guide them, and showing how state‑building advances one defined responsibility at a time. This is both the opportunity and the obligation of anyone writing for a national audience who claims to care about Somalia’s future.
[1] The author is a Somali American lawyer based in Nairobi. The views expressed in this op-ed are his own and do not reflect those of any organization with which he may be affiliated. He can be reached at bsali@yahoo.com.
[2]. Sovereignty Without a Nation: Somalia and the Incomplete State. Hiiraan Online, June 20, 2025.
/op4/2025/jun/201982/sovereignty_without_a_nation_somalia_and_the_incomplete_state.aspx
[3]. Somalia’s Future Starts in the Minds of Its Citizens. Hiiraan Online, May 15, 2025.
/op4/2025/may/201521/somalia_s_future_starts_in_the_minds_of_its_citizens.aspx
[4] Beyond the disputes driving today’s political crisis, missing constitutional institutions such as competent federal courts and independent commissions would resolve disputes that now linger in Somalia. These include boundary disagreements between states or over territorial waters, questions over public resource management, and concerns about corruption or misuse of state assets. In their absence, such matters are left to political bargaining or public speculation, deepening mistrust and weakening lawful governance.
[5]. How Media Narrative Sustains Division in Somalia. Hiiraan Online, July 22, 2025.
/op4/2025/july/202287/how_media_narrative_sustains_division_in_somalia.aspx.
The author is a Somali-American lawyer based in Nairobi. The views expressed in this op-ed are his own and do not reflect those of any organization with which he may be affiliated. He can be reached at bsali@yahoo.com.